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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-Although general
warrants and writs of assistance are not expressly mentioned. among
the grievances set out in the Declaration of Independence, unquestionably they served to fan the flames of incipient revolution.1 Indeed, none
other than John Adams said of James Otis' argument against writs of
assistance: "Then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child
l LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CoNSTITUTION (1937); Wood, "The Scope of the Constitutional
Immunity Against Searches and Seizures," 34 W. VA. L. Q. I (1927).
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Independence was born." 2 With English tyranny fresh in their minds,
the members of th·e first Congress of the United States manifested their
antipathy to governmental invasions of privacy by drafting for ratification the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, . against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."

•

The most important step in the development of this constitutional
provision came in 1886 in the famous case of Boyd v. United States.3
There the Court gave life to the Fourth Amendment by recognizing its
intimate relation to the Fifth Amendment; 4 thus laying the foundation
for the federal rule that the Fifth Amendment protects every person
from incrimination by the use of evidence obtained through search or
seiz1].re made in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment.5
With the exception of a temporary setback in 1903,6 this rule, as restated in the Weeks case,7 has effectively weathered a barrage of criticism. But recent decisions indicate a modified interpretati6n of the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The cases of
Davis v. United States 8 and Zap v. United States/ which arose out of
governmental regulation during World War II, deserve scrutiny, for
they evidence a trend in_ judicial thought inconsistent with established
precedent.
l

Davis was suspected of running a black market in gasoline. Government agents drove their cars into his station 10· and succeeded in purchasing gas without ration stamps from an employee by paying twenty
2 IO WORKS OF JOHN

ADAMS 248 (1856).
116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524 (1886).
4 The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.••."
5 The Court'relied on the landmark case of Entick v. Carrington, 19 HoWELL's
STATE TRIALS 1029 (1765), where Lord Camden emphasized the connection between the privilege against unreasonable searches and that against self incrimination.
6
Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 24 S. Ct. 372 (1904).
7
Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914). There the
Court held that evidence procured by federal agents was inadmissable because the
-taking was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
8
(U. S. 1946) 66 S. Ct. 1256.
9
(U.S. 1946) 66 S. Ct. 1277.
10 The station was owned by Davis under a corporate· form. A corporation is
protected against unlawful search and seizure by the Fourth Amendment. Silverthorne
Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182 (1920); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370 (1906).
8

-
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cents a gallon above the ceiling price. Subsequently the employee was
arrested, and Davis, upon his arrival at the station, was also arrested
on the same charge: selling gasoline without coupons and in excess of the
ceiling price--a misdemeanor.11 The officers demanded and received
from Davis the keys for the locked boxes on the pumps intended for the
deposit of gasoline ration coupons, and a discrepancy in the amount by
which the storage tanks had been diminished by sales and the coupons in
the boxes soon became apparent. Davis went with two of the agents to
the waiting room of his office, which was on the premises, and, when
questioned, informed them that he had in his private office sufficient coupons to make up the deficiencies. The door to the private office was locked
and Davis persistently refused to unlock it. However, upon observing
that another agent was shining a flashlight through an outside window
of the private office and was apparently trying to raise the window,
Davis unlocked the door. He took some envelopes froni a filing cabinet
in the private office and handed them to the agents. The contents of
these envelopes formed the basis for the charge of illegal possession of
gasoline ration coupons.12 It was upon this charge, also a misdemeanor,
that he was later prosecuted and convicted. No search warrant or warrant of arrest was ever issued. The district court, having refused the
petitioner's timely motions for exclusion of the evidence, found that
Davis had voluntarily consented to the search and seizure. The circuit
court of appeals questioned this finding, yet preferred to sustain the
conviction on the ground that the search and seizure were reasonable
as incident to the arrest.13 Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court,
and in a 4-3 decision,1¼ the judgment was affirmed.
The decision of the Court written by Justice Douglas commences
with a recognition of the interplay of the Fo-Urth and Fifth Amendments in the law of search and seizure, and of the theories behind these
constitutional provisions. Nevertheless the opinion proceeds to do violence to the very theories which it professes to recognize. While the
decision rests on consent to a search and seizure incident to an arrest,
suggestions of far reaching import are proposed, all of which are attacked in an exhaustive dissent by Justice Frankfurter.
Congressional legislation enacted under the war power, author11 56 Stat. L. 176 at 179, § 301 (1942), 50 U.S.C. Appy. (Supp. v 1946)
§§ 633, 2 (a) (5). Presidential power under this statute was delegated to the Ad-

ministrator of the Office of Price Administration, who promulgated ration orders for
gasoline.
12
56 Stat. L. 196 at 179, § 301 (1942), 50 U.S.C. (Supp v, 1946) Appx.
§§ 633, 2 (a) (5). Such offense was contrary to the provisions of Amendment 87 to

Ration Order No. 5C, § 1934.8177 (c), 8 FED. REG. 16420 at 16423 (Dec. 7, 1943),
issued by the Office of Price Administration.
_
18
United States v. Davis, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 151 F. (2d) 140.
u Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Murphy concurred. Justice Rutledge dissented in a separate opinion.
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ized the inspection of gasoline coupons by law enforcement o:fficials.15
But the right to inspect is not questioned in the present case.
The validity of the search and seizure by the government agents is the
point of inquiry. In examining the opinion of the court, it is perhaps
best :first to consider the distinct bases for the decision and then to point
out frailities in the reasoning. The Court in the :final analysis seeks to
justify its opinion on the basis of consent to a search and seizure incident
to the arrest.16 Thus it has merged the :findings of the district court and
the circuit court of appeals, the former :finding consent and the latter
holding the search and seizure sustainable as incident to the arrest. It
is well to note that either of these grounds will ordinarily suffice alone;
that is, a search and seizure with consent or incident to a lawful arrest
is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Be that as it may,,
careful consideration of both theories brings to light their misapplication in the principal case.
a. Consent. Where individual liberties are concerned, it is a cardinal principle that constitutional provisions should be construed strongly
in favor of the individual.17 It has been said that there is a presumption
against the waiver of constitutional rights.18 If so, no such presumption
was invoked by the court in the present case. The opinion sets forth a
pro forma acceptance of the dubious_ :findings of the district court.19
This was not the :first time that the Supreme Court had to deal with the
question of consent. In Amos v. United States,2° the defendant's wife
allowed government agents to enter his home without a warrant upon
their demand for admission. Due to the presence of "implied coercion," it was held that the wife's conduct would not suffice as a waiver of
defendant's constitutional privilege against unreasonable search and
seizure. The court appears to have come a long way since the Amos
case, and on~ wonders how far it will go in :finding consent. The present
15

56 Stat. L. 176 at 179, § 301 (1942), 50 U.S.C. (Supp. v, 1946) Appx.

§ 633, 2 (a) (3) (1946). See Ration Order No. 5C, § 1394.8235 (b).
16
"We accordingly affirm the judgment below without reaching, the question
whether but for that consent the search and seizure incidental to the arrest were reasonable." Principal case at I 262.
17
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 at 635, 6 S'. Ct. 524 (1886): "It is the
duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis." See also,
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261 (1921).
18
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938).
19
Said Justice Learned Hand, for the circuit court of appeals: '~•.. we must own
to some doubt whether a consent obtained under such circumstances should properly be
regarded as 'voluntary.' Davis must have known, under arrest as he was, that the
officers were not likely to stand very long upon ceremony, but in one way or another,
would enter the office." United States v. Davis, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 151. F. (2d)
14b at 142. See Justice Frankfurter's dissent, Principal case at 1264.
20
255 U.S. 313, 41 S. Ct. 266 (1921) •.
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opinion indicates that the agent who :fl.ashed his light through the outside window of the private office was "apparently trying to raise the
window." 21 One agent testified: "I didn't try to convince him. I told
him that he would have to open that door." 22 "According to the District Court, the officers 'persuaded him that it would be a better thing
for him to permit them to examine' the coupons; 'they talked him into
it'." 28 Need there be physical violence to constitute coercion? 24 The
fundamental nature of constitutional protections should make the court
wary in finding consent, especially where the circumstances, as in the
Davis case, are clouded with doubt. To do otherwise is to frustrate the
purpose of the Amendment.
b. Incident to the Arrest. The decision turns in part on the theory
of a search and seizure incident to the arrest, but the Court- devotes
little time to this aspect of the case. This unquestioned adoption of the
theory of the circuit court of appeals is indeed open to question. An
analysis of the situation involves the application of the' prime criterion
of reasonableness, for if the search is "reasonable," it does not violate
the Fourth Amendment. As the court once said: "There is no formula
for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on
its own facts and circumstances." 25 Precedent is, however, "Wtluable in
ascertaining what constitutes a reasonable search. Perhaps at one time
in its history it might have been argued that the Supreme Court would
sustain general explanatory searches and seizures as incident to a lawful
arrest where the crime was committed in the presence of the officer.26
But such contention was dispelled by the Court in subsequent cases,21
and prior to the Davis case, the view had developed that such a search
and seizure could extend only to the person of the offender and to that
property on the premises in plain view and under his -immediate control.28 This was not the situation in the instant case. Here the coupons
concealed in Davis' office were not in plain view. But even if this miss21 Principal case lit 1258.
22 Ibid.
28 Id. at 1261.
u Justice Frank, in his concurring opinion in United States v. Davis, (C.C.A. id,
1945) 151 F. (2d) 140 at 144, expressly rejected the contention of the Assistant
United States Attorney that observation of the right of officers to inspect the records of
a government regulated business constituted, in effec, he legal equivalen of consent
to enter.
25 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 at 357, 51 S. Ct. 153
(1931).
26
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 48 S. Ct. 74 (1927).
27
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 51 S. Ct. 153 (1931);
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S. Ct. 420 (1932).
28 See note 27, supra. Also, LAssoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT oF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 128 (1937).
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ing element were present, the search and seizure would not be reason- able within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Rutledge
emphasizes this in his dissent:
"Moreover, whatever may be the scope of search incident to
lawfytl arrest for a misdemeanor, I- know of no decision which goes
so far as to rule that this right of search extends to breaking and
entering locked premises by force. That was not done here. But
the search followed on consent given in the reasonable belief that
it was necessary to avoid the breaking and entry. I think it was
therefore in no better case legally than if in fact the breaking and
forceable entry had dccurred." 29
Furthermore, since the arrest was for sale of gasoline without coupons and in excess of the ceiling price, the coupons were not "things
used to carry on the criminal enterprise," so but constituted the corpus
delicti of another crime, the illegal possession of coupons. The confines
of the doctrine of search incident to an arrest will not enclose a search
for "articles n_ecessary to the commission of a crime other than that for
which the arrest was made." 81
c. Public Character of Documents. In an attempt to muster support
for its ruling, the court places great reliance on the basic distinction
under the Fourth Amendment between private papers and public property.22 Incriminating documents of a private nature are not subject to
compulsory production because of the privilege against self incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Those papers in which the
public has an interest may be claimed by legal process, i.e., by a search
warrant or subpoena duces tecum. But the decision in the Davis case
would lead one to believe that public documents may be seized without
a warrant. In this respect the court has misinterpreted the language of
earlier cases.88 Adherence to such heresy would undermine the very
thing the Fourth Amendment was formulated to prevent. It would,
for example, justify the warrantless search of every business possessing
docl¥Ilents required to be kept under federal authority.
d. Search of place of business. The opinion emphasizes the fact that
the coupons were at a place of business, as distinct from a private resi29 Principal case at 1276:
so Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 19z at 199, 48 S. Ct. 74 (1927).
Principal case at 1271.
82
Id. at 1258, 1259.
as.The Court quotes from Wilson v. United States, 2ZI U.S. 361, 31 S. Ct. 538
(19n), where it held that an officer of a corporation cannot refuse to surrender the
corporate records on the ground that he will thereby incriminate himself. That decision, however, did not dispense with the requirement of legal process for the production of the records, for there the Government sought to obtain the documents by
subpoena duces tecum.
81
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dence.84 This is a strange ground for differentiation inasmuch as the
court has in previous cases held offices to be within the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.85 Certainly an office, set-off from the public at
large, falls within the intent and purpose of this Amendment.
But an even greater objection is disclosed by Justice Frankfurter
in his dissent. 86 Not only should the evidence have been excluded because it was acquired by unreasonable search and seizure in violation of
the constitutional rights of the defendant, but also because such evidence was unprocurable even under a search warrant. The Espionage
Act 87 limits the issuance of search warrants to situations in which the
property sought was stolen or embezzled, used as a means of committing a felony, or used to aid illegally a foreign nation. Davis was
charged with and convicted of the illegal possession of gasoline ration
coupons, a misdemeanor, which does not fall within the enumerated
categories. Hence we have the extraordinary situation that evidence
unobtainable even with a warrant was held admissible when obtained in
a search and seizure of doubtful lawfulness.88 There is merit in the
contention of Justice Frankfurter that "'.The Court's opinion has only
its own reasoning to support it." 89
2
0

In Zap v. United States,4' the petitioner had entered into a contract
with the Navy on a cost plus fixed fee basis. He arranged with a pilot
to make certain test flights for $2,500, and had him endorse a blank
check which he (Zap) later filled in with the pilot's name and the sum
of $4,000. This check was the basis for a certified claim to the Navy
department. Government agents audited his books and records pursuant to an Act of Congress 41 and a provision to this effect in the con84

Principal case at 1261.
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 51 S. Ct. 153 (1931);
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber
Co. Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182 (1920).
H Principal case at I 262.
87
40 Stat. L. 217 at 228 (1917), 18 U.S.C. (1940) § 612. Congress has
granted specific authority whenever it wished to permit searches and seizures, thus
manifesting its reluctance to extend the scope of a search under judicial process.
Appendix, Principal case at 1273.
88
Although a search warrant cannot be utilized to obtain the coupons, the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration has the power to subpoena them.
56 Stat. L. 23 at 30, § 202 (c) (1942), 50 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1946) Appx. § 922 (c).
89
Principal case at 1266.
40
(U.S. 1946) 66 S. Ct. 1277.
41
The Second War Powers Act, 56 Stat. L. 176 at 185, § 1301 (1942), 50
U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1946) Appx. § 643 provides: "The provisiQlls of section 10 (1) of
an Act approved July 2, 1926 (44 Stat. 787; IO U.S.C. 310 (1)) (giving the Government the right to inspect the plant and audit the books of certain Contractors),
85
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tract. Without a warrant, they obtained the $4,000 check which was
utilized in the prosecution of the petitioner. A preliminary motion to
suppress the check as evidence was denied, and Zap was convicted of
presenting false claims against the United States--a felony. The case
came to the Supreme Court from the circuit court of appeals on certiorari, and the Justices lined up, as in the Davis case, 4-3 in favor of
the decision of the lower court.
"To require reversal here," said Justice Douglas, "would be to
exalt a technicality to constitutional levels." 42 The Court recognized
that consent to the inspection did not include consent to the taking of
the check, yet found "no wrongdoing in the method by which the incriminating evidence was obtained." 43 As Justice Frankfurter points
out,44 the fact that the inspection was legal did not make the subsequent
seizure ipso facto legal. The right to search does not necessarily include
the authority to seize. Pro<;;edural regularity would seem to justify
the exclusion of the evidence though it might have been secured by a
lawful warrant.
·

3
The meaning of the Fourth Amendment is uncertain in light of
these recent cases. Although the Court appears to pay lip-service to
traditional doctrines, the tendency is so to enlarge the scope of "reasonable search and seizure" as to minimize the safeguards of the Fourth
, Amendment. One can only hazard a guess as to the implications which
may follow from any given decision, but the present cases seem to
indicate a change in approach on the part of the Court in the judicial
construction of the Fourth Amendment. These cases suggest the beginning of an adandonment of preexisting philosophy, which, in some
degree was shaped by Holmes 45 and Brandeis,46 in favor of Wigmorean logic 47 which maintains that evidence illegally procured should
shall apply to the plant, books, and records of any contractor with whom a defense
contract has been placed at any .time after the declaration of emergency on· September
8, 1939, and before the termination of the present war. . . ." ,
42 Principal case at I 280.
43 lbid.
44
ld. at 1281.
45
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182
(1920).
" ..• I think it less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Gov, ernment should play an ignoble part." Holmes, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 at 470, 48 S. Ct. 564 (1928). ·
·
46
Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. _310, 48 S. Ct. 137 (1927). See dissent
of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. Unit<;!d States, 277 U.S. 438 at 471, 48 S. Ct.
564 (1928).
47
8 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2183 et seq. (1940). Professor Wigmore is quite
outspoken in his condemnation of the doctrine of the Weeks case.

1
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not be excluded. Perhaps the Court now feels that the precedent established by the dicta in the Boyd case was not worth following, and is
adopting the view of many state courts which admit evidence obtained
by unreasonable search and seizure.48 This possible interpretation of
these cases merits an examination into the justification for excluding
the evidence.
No doctrine of the common law excluded evidence obtained by
unreasonable search and seizure.49 In view of this, the hue and cry
raised by Wigmore and others in opposition to the federal rule is
understandable. Yet an inquiry into the basis of the common law rule
discloses that it is not totally inconsistent with federal procedure. A
very strong argument for receiving the evidence at common law was
that an inquiry into the nature of the illegality of the search would raise
collateral issues. 50 With this objection in mind, Justice Day in the
Weeks case 51 qualified the decision of the Boyd case by requiring that
the petition for suppression of the evidence be made before trial, so as
to eliminate these subsidiary inquiries. While this rule has been modified to some extent by ensuing decisions, 52 the collateral issue argument
is at its best questionable, for even at common law it contained exceptions. 58
•
As the critics point out, there is nothing in the Fourth Amendment
to classify it as a rule of evidence. When the Supreme Court in ,the
Boyd case established the proposition that evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional rights of an individual under the Fourth
Amendment cannot be utilized because of the Fifth Amendment, its
For a criticism of Wigmore's arguments, see 8 A.B.A.J. 646 (1922).
The leading decision in support of the common law rule is People v. Defore, 242
N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
~ " . . . the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegaUty of the
means through which the party has been enabled to obtain the e'llidence. .••" 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 5 (1940).
5
Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Mete. (43 Mass.) 329 (1841); People v. Mayen,
188 Cal. 237, 205 P. 435 (1922).
51
232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914).
52
"A rule of practice must not be allowed for any technical reason to prevail
over a constitutional right." Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 at 313, 41 S. Ct.
261 (1921). Also, Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 41 S. Ct. 266 (1921);
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4 (1925).
FEDERAL RuLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 41 {e) (Motion for Return of
Property and to Suppress Evidence) provides:
" ..• The motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor
did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the
court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing."
58
E.g. A court will always stop the trial of an action to determine whether a confession was obtained by threat or promise of reward. Commonwealth v. Culver, I 26
Mass. 464 (1879).
'8
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intent was to effectuate the common purpose of both Amendments to
preserve individual privacy.5 4, The Court found that" ... the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the Fourth Amendment
are always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence
against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth
Amendment...." 55 For that reason it decided to exclude such evid~nce.
,
Self-help, civil liability of the officer, or penal sanctions for the
offending agent have been urged as proper methods for the vindication
of the rights of the aggrieved person. 56 However, these means will not
adequately protect the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment. Individuals are reluctant to exercise the ancient common law remedy of
self-help, for this would place the burden on the individual to determine whether or not the search is justified. It is difficult to imagine a
jury awarding more than nominal damages in a civil action against
the investigator. Professor Wigmore urges the imposition of a thirtyday imprisonment on the over-zealous marshal for his contempt of the
Constitution.51 But this suggestion overlooks the obvious hesitance of
prosecutors to punish their own agents. Strict -criminal punishment
would in the end merely accomplish the same results as are now reached
by excluding the evidence. Officers would be unwilling to embark on
an unreasonable search and seizure if imprisonment were staring them
in the face, and little if any evidence would be seized in violation of
constitutional rights. A possible consequence might be the failure to
conduct•even reasonable searches. The exclusion of the evidence is the
only effective, though indirect, means of enforcing the intent of the
constitutional framers. No rule of formal logic should stand in its way.
Thus one finds the rule of exclusion justifiable on two grounds:
{I) as within the policy of the Fifth Amendment; ( 2) as the only
satisfactory means of enforcing the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment. 58 The test, however, lies in the practical -consequences of the
!i4, See Boyd v. United States, II6 U.S. 616 at 630, 6 S. Ct. 524 (1886), where .
the Court speaks with approval of Lord Camden's decision in Entick v. Carrington,
19 HowELL's STATE TRIALS 1029 (1765).
" .•. Privacy is just as much and as unreasonably infringed by the seizure of a
document or a chattel as by compelling a person to produce the same or to testify concerning them in such manner as to incriminate himself; and the practical result is the
same." Atkinson, "Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures," 25 CoL. L. REV. II at 17 (1925).
55
Boyd v. United States, n6 U.S. 616 at 633, 6 S. Ct. 524 (1886).
56
See criticisms of such suggestions; Atkinson, "Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures," 25 CoL. L. REV. II (1925);
CoRNELrns, SEARcH AND SE1zuRE; 2d ed., 44 (1930).
7
li 8 W1cMORE, EvmENCE 40 (1940).
58
See generally, Atkinson, "Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures," 28 CoL. L. REv. II (1925).
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doctrine. Does it in fact or should it hamper law enforcement? In the
language of Justice Cardozo, "The question is whether protection for
the individual woµld not be gained at a disproportionate loss of protection for society." 59 The writer can only theorize, for no statistics are
available. It is his contention that in practically every case the federal
rule with its exceptions does not materially impede government agents
in the performance of their duties. In those situations where the insistence on a warrant would enable evidence to be removed or destroyed
before a warrant could be obtained, the courts have eliminated this requirement. For example, a warrantless search of the person and immediate premises of an offender as an incident to a lawful arrest is reasonable within the Fourth Arnendrnent.60 Open fields likewise fall in the
same category.61 Automobiles and vessels may be searched without
warrants on "probable cause." 62 This constitutional right may be
waived; 63 and federal investigators are provided with a form for this.
purpose. In all other instances, it should be possible for government
officers to procure warrants so that the evidence is not lost. That investigation often extends over a considerable period of time corroborates this conclusion. The law should not be framed for inefficient
agents.
It has been argued that the many exceptions indicate flaws in the
rule. This proposition, however, fails to recognize that certain classifications do not fall within tlie Fourth Amendment, which prohibits
only "unreasonable searches and seizures." 6 "'
What is to be the future of this federal doctrine? Certainly the
Davis case, and to a lesser degree the Zap case also, mark a retrogression in legal reasoning tantamount to judicial ratification of the supposition that the end justifies the means. This result, inconsistent with
the tendency of the court to extend the protection of individual freedoms under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Arnendrnent,65
has far reach~ng implications. Government agents may seize upon these.
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13 at 24, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 48 S. Ct. 74 (1927).
61 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S. Ct. 445 ·(1924).
62 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925); United States
v. Lee, 274 ~.S. 559, 47 S. Ct. 746 (1927).
68 Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 38 S. Ct. 417 (1918); CoRNELIUs,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 2d ed.,§ 17 (1930).
6 "' Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. It will suffice to
remind those who point to the fact that evidence illegally procured by private individuals is admissible in Federal courts [Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S. Ct.
574 (1921)], that the Fourth Amendment inhibits only Federal action.
·
65 E.g. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S. Ct. 276 (1946). In general,
see Dowling, "Constitutional Developments in Five War Years," 32 VA. L. REv. 461
(1946).
59
60
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cases to sanction practices t4at might cast opprobrium on the law itself.
The innocent as well as the guilty would be affected.66 If the Fourth
Amendment is to stand as a barrier against governmental encroachment
on personal privacy, the court must heed the warning of Justice Sutherland:
"The Fourth Amendment was adopted in view of long misuse
of power in the matter of searches and seizures both in England
and the colonies; and the assurance against any revival of it, so
carefully embodied in the fundamental law, i~ not to be impaired
by judicial sanction of equivocal methods, which, regarded superficially, may seem to escape the challenge of illegality hut which,
in reality, strike at the substance of the constitutional right." 67
Howard A. Jacobs., S.Ed.

66 "It is not only under Nazi rule that police excesses are inimical to freedom. It
is easy to make light of insistence on scrupulous regard for the safeguards of civil liberties when invoked on behalf of the unworthy. It is too easy. History bears testimony
that by such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished, heedlessly at first, then
stealthily, and brazenly in the end." Frankfurter, J., in his dissent, Davis v. United
States, (U.S. 1946) 66 S. Ct. 1256 _at 1263.
67 Byars v. United States, 273~ U.S. 28 at 33, 47 S. Ct. 24~ (1927).

